Virginia Regulatory Assessment Template

**Instructions:**

* Select one (1) “performance area” or outcome from the following set to evaluate how existing regulatory mechanisms in Virginia support (incentivize) the achievement of that outcome or disincentivize the achievement of the outcome. Consider this question for each regulatory mechanism identified in the template, and for the overall performance of Virginia’s utility regulatory structure to support (or hinder) that outcome (performance area).
* Each stakeholder should complete worksheets for at least two performance areas of their choosing. Additional (more than two) performance areas can be evaluated in additional worksheets, at your discretion.

**Reference Key:** Performance Areas from *House Joint Resolution No. 30 / Senate Joint Resolution No. 47*

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| Reliability and resiliency | Affordability for customers |
| Emergency response and safety | Cost-efficient utility investments and operations |
| Peak demand reductions | Maximization of available federal funding |
| Cyber and physical security of the grid | Savings maximization from energy efficiency and exceedance of statutorily required savings levels |
| Annual and monthly generation and resource needs in addition to hourly generation and resource needs on the 10 hottest and coldest days of the year | DER integration and speed of interconnection |
| Customer service | Beneficial electrification |
| Environmental justice and equity | Electricity decarbonization |

**Regulatory Assessment**

|  |  |  |
| --- | --- | --- |
| **Outcome** | What regulatory *outcome* or *performance area* does this assessment consider? | Reliability and resiliency. |
| **Do the existing regulatory mechanisms and programs sufficiently support the outcome?** |
| **Key** |  |
| **+** | **Yes** | The mechanism or program **incents achievement** of this outcome. |
| **0** | **No Impact** | The mechanism or program **does not seem to impact the achievement** of this outcome. |
| **-** | **No** | The mechanism or program **disincentivizes the achievement** of this outcome. |
| **Existing Regulatory Mechanisms and Programs** | **Description** | **Mechanism or Program’s Effect on Outcome** | **Issues for Attention** |
| **Score (+/0/-)** | **Discussion** |
| Rate Reviews (typically biennial) | Forward-looking | 0 |  |  |
| Backward-looking (w/ earnings adjustments)  | 0 |  |  |
| **ROE Determinations** |  | 0 |  |  |
| **Rate Adjustment Clauses (i.e., trackers)** | RACs overall (general assessment of the use of RACs) | 0 |  |  |
| Fuel Cost Recovery | 0 |  |  |
| Purchased power | +/- |  |  |
| Demand response program costs | 0 |  |  |
| RPS compliance costs | 0 |  |  |
| Broadband capacity extension | 0 |  |  |
| Low-income programs (lost revenue recovery) | 0 |  |  |
| Capital projects (e.g., combined cycle gas projects, offshore wind, solar, distribution system undergrounding, distribution grid transformation, nuclear life extension, etc.) | +/- |  |  |
| **Other trackers** (user choice to select additional trackers used in Virginia rate making for attention) |  | 0 |  |  |
|  | 0 |  |  |
| **Transmission cost recovery (FERC formula rates)** | Transmission costs as allocated in FERC formula rates, recovered from customers via trackers (RACs) and/or base rates | +/- |  |  |
| **Performance adjustments and measurement** | ROE adjustment mechanisms | 0 |  |  |
| Energy efficiency savings target (ROE adder applied to DSN operating expenses) | 0 |  |   |
| Performance mechanisms (e.g., metrics, scorecards, PIMS), including Case No. PUR-2023-00210 (Separate SCC PBR Case) | 0 |  |  |
| **Other ratemaking and regulatory features** | IRPs | +/- |  |  |
| Certificates of Public Need and Necessity (CPCN) | +/- |  |  |
| Rate design (including universal service fee) | +/- |  |  |
| Pilot programs | +/- |  |  |

Overall Assessment

|  |  |
| --- | --- |
| **Overall, does the existing regulatory framework support achievement of the identified outcome?** | **Discussion** |
| **+ (YES)** incents achievement |  |  |
| **0 (NO IMPACT)** |  | VMA advocates for the optimal balance in electric generation capacity. The existing regulatory framework incents achievement of reliability and resiliency to the extent that it ensures sufficient generation to meet demand without surplus or deficit. Conversely, if the framework leads to overproduction or shortages, VMA considers it to disincentivize the achievement of reliability and resiliency. Manufacturers compete on quality and price. EITE industries are highly sensitive to energy prices and the Commonwealth has been on a highest cost trajectory since 2000, putting manufacturing jobs and assets in the Commonwealth at risk. When electricity costs go up and/or reliability goes down, it results in a high probability of “carbon leakage” from the manufacturing sector.  |
| **- (NO)** disincentivizes achievement |  |  |